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Abstract  
As rights holders, courts, and policy makers worldwide struggle with the question of 
copyright infringement and the potential liability of internet service providers (ISPs) worldwide, 
Russia developed – and subsequently abandoned – a proposal for the creation of a global license 
to be imposed on ISPs which would allow for rights holders to be compensated for copyright-
infringing activities carried out through those ISPs. 
Russia is not the first jurisdiction to look at a global license as solution to the wide spread 
of copyright infringements online. By analysing the Russian proposal for a global license, this 
article addresses the sustainability of such a model on a wider scale by analysing the legal 
implications this may cause. In this context, this article will address the Russian proposal’s 
legislative history before moving into a substantive discussion about the synergies between legal 
justifications and merits of a global license. 
 
Keywords: copyright; copyright policy; alternative remuneration systems; global license; 
three-step test. 
 
Introduction 
This article briefly analyses the evolution of  ISP liability regulation in Russia to provide a 
framework to the latest proposal of a global license which sought to tackle the issue of online 
copyright infringement by enabling internet users to freely share and download creative works in 
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exchange for a small fee payable together with the internet access fee. The paper looks into the 
details of the Russian proposal, the arguments pro and against, and it’s historical precedents (the 
French licence globale and German Kultur flat-rate) to assess the conformity of such alternative 
remuneration systems with international obligations and their possible future. 
  
1. ISP liability: the Russian context 
In Russia, the development of the rules regulating ISP liability for infringement of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) committed by users can be broken down into two stages. Pre-
2013, ISP liability for IPR infringements was scarcely regulated by legislation and largely to be 
found in seminal decisions of the arbitration courts.4 This has changed in 2013, when the Federal 
Law No. 187-FZ,5 often referred to as the Anti-piracy Law, entered into force and introduced into 
Russian legislation rules regulating ISP liability for IPR infringement as well as created a 
procedure for blocking websites facilitating copyright infringement. 
Before 2013, the rules relating to ISP liability for copyright infringement could be gleaned 
from a number of arbitration courts’ decisions, including the judgments in Content i Pravo v 
Masterhost and MetKom6 in which the right holder sued a provider of colocation services, and Top 
7 v Softkey, Dignata Media, Agava-soft7 which concerned liability of a file-locker website 
administrator. 
                                                 
4 Arbitration courts are the courts which exercise jurisdiction over commercial disputes in Russia. Not to be confused 
with arbitration as a form of alternative dispute resolution. 
5 О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации по вопросам защиты 
интеллектуальных прав в информационно-телекоммуникационных сетях : Федеральный закон : 3 июля 2013 
г. № 187-ФЗ [Federal Law on Amendment of Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Concerning the 
Issues of Protection of Intellectual Rights in Information and Telecommunications Networks dated 3 July 2013 No. 
187-FZ] // Собр. законодательства Рос. Федерации. 2013. № 27. Ст. 3479. 
6 Постановление Президиума Высшего арбитражного суда Российской Федерации № 10962/08, Москва, 23 
декабря 2008 г. [Decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation No. 10962/08, 
Moscow, 23 December 2008]. 
7 Постановление Президиума Высшего арбитражного суда Российской Федерации № 6672/11, Москва, 1 
ноября 2011 г. [Decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation No. 6672/11, 
Moscow, 1 November 2011]. 
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In these cases, the Supreme Court of Arbitration8 drew up a list of factors which must be 
assessed when deciding the issue of ISP liability for IPR infringements committed by third parties. 
Among these factors were the degree of involvement of an ISP in the process of transfer of 
information and implementation by an ISP of preventive measures which stop IPR infringements. 
On 1 August 2013, the Anti-piracy law came into force. This law introduced a new legal 
term: ‘information intermediary’, and regulated liability of such entities for IPR infringements. 
These changes are enshrined in the new Article 1253.1 of the Russian Civil Code.9 
Although the aim of the Anti-piracy law was to set out the regulation of ISP liability for 
IPR infringements on the statutory level, the new law arguably came short of reaching this goal in 
several aspects. 
For example, it is not entirely clear what entities can be considered information 
intermediaries as Article 1253.1 of the Civil Code does not contain a general definition. Instead, 
information intermediaries are defined by listing their specific types. Depending on the type of 
information intermediary, it will have to comply with different conditions to avoid liability for IPR 
infringements. 
Furthermore, this classification is slightly different from the classifications provided in the 
United States’ Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)10 or the European Union’s E-
Commerce Directive.11 The classification provided in Article 1253.1 is less clear which, in turn, 
makes it more difficult to tell in advance what type of an information intermediary a particular ISP 
will be in each specific case. Being able to distinguish between different types of information 
intermediaries is important as different types of information intermediaries have to comply with 
different requirements to qualify for a safe harbour. Perhaps more importantly, Article 1253.1 does 
not explicitly provide safe harbours for certain types of information intermediaries. 
Article 1253.1 also comes short of establishing rules for substantive liability of information 
intermediaries. Instead, Article 1253.1 merely states that the information intermediary can be 
                                                 
8 The Supreme Arbitration Court had been the most senior arbitration court in Russia until its was disbanded in 2014 
and cases formerly within its jurisdiction were transferred to the Supreme Court of Russia. 
9 Гражданский кодекс Российской Федерации. Часть четвертая : 18 декабря 2006 г. № 230-ФЗ [Civil Code of 
the Russian Federation, Part 4 dated 18 December 2006 No. 230-FZ] // Собр. законодательства Рос. Федерации. 
2006. № 52 (Ч. 1). Ст. 5496. 
10 17 US Code § 512. 
11 Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178/1 (E-Commerce Directive). 
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found liable under the general rules of the Civil Code if its fault is established. The problem is that 
under the ‘general rules’ of the Civil Code, in order to infringe IPRs, it is usually necessary to use 
the work in question (e.g., to copy the work or make it available). However, information 
intermediaries do not normally use works themselves – the works are used (and infringements are 
committed) by users of the services provided by information intermediaries. As the Supreme Court 
of Arbitration observed in Content i Pravo v Masterhost and MetKom, a person who does not use 
a creative work cannot be held to infringe the authors’ rights in respect of this work. Thus, it is not 
clear what the exact ground for liability of information intermediaries is when infringements are 
committed by users. Article 1253.1 also does not further explain what circumstances must exist 
for the ISP’s fault to be established. 
Finally, Article 1253.1 of the Civil Code makes availability of safe harbours dependent on 
the information intermediary’s lack of actual or imputed knowledge about IPR infringements. At 
the same time, Article 1253.1 provides limited guidance on how such knowledge can be accessed. 
In addition to creating a statutory framework for ISP liability, the Anti-piracy Law also 
introduced a right for right holders to request preliminary website blocking injunctions allowing 
them to expediently restrict access to a website used to commit infringements whilst they prepare 
to sue the website administrator for IPR infringement.12  Although initially preliminary website 
blocking injunctions were available only for protection of rights in video content, in 2015 their 
scope was expanded by the Federal Law No. 364-FZ to include other creative works with 
exception of photographs.13 The Federal Law No. 364-FZ also created a new procedure for 
permanent blocking of websites which repeatedly infringe authors’ rights. 
                                                 
12 Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации : Федеральный закон : 27 июля 
2006 г. № 149-ФЗ [Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information dated 27 
July 2006 No. 149-FZ] // Собр. законодательства Рос. Федерации. 2006. № 31 (Ч. 1). Ст. 3448, ст. 15.6. 
13 О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон "Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите 
информации" и Гражданский процессуальный кодекс Российской Федерации : Федеральный закон : 27 ноября 
2014 г. № 364-ФЗ [Federal Law on Amendment of the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and 
Protection of Information” and the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation dated 27 November 2014 No. 364-
FZ] // Собр. законодательства Рос. Федерации. 2014. № 48. Ст. 6645. 
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Website blocking is widely used by right holders: the Moscow City Court has granted more 
than 700 preliminary website blocking injunctions,14 permanent website blocking has been used 
against 15 largest BitTorrent-trackers.15 
In 2017, website blocking measures available to right holders were further strengthened. 
Russian authorities can now block access to providers of VPN and other services which can be 
used by internet users to circumvent website blocking.16 Web search engines that show advertising 
to internet users in Russia have to delist from their search results links to website that have been 
previously blocked in accordance with Russian legislation.17 An expedited procedure for blocking 
copies of previously blocked websites has also been implemented.1819 
As discussed, Russia has developed a legal framework which gives right holders access to 
a variety of measures to help them protect their IPRs and to stop and prevent IPR infringements: 
they can use the notice and takedown procedure, sue internet service providers, and apply for 
website blocking orders against websites facilitating IPR infringement. Alexander Zharov, the 
head of the Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies 
and Mass Communications, the authority overseeing website blocking in Russia, reported that the 
antipiracy legislation was one of the reasons which helped the online video distribution industry 
to grow by 14.7% in 2015.20 
                                                 
14 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘2017 Special 301 Report’ (Office of the United States Trade 
Representative) <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2017%20Special%20301%20Report%20FINAL.PDF> 
accessed 27 March 2018, 47. 
15 ‘Александр Жаров (Роскомнадзор): «Сегодня всю нашу работу мы рассматриваем через призму уменьшения 
давления на предпринимательское сообщество»’ [Alexander Zharov (Roskomnadzor): “Today all our work is 
considered in the light of reducing the pressure on the business community”’] (respectr.com, 4 February 2016) 
<http://www.rspectr.com/article/intervyu/aleksandr-zharov-roskomnadzor/> accessed 16 October 2016. 
16 Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации : Федеральный закон : 27 июля 
2006 г. № 149-ФЗ [Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information dated 27 
July 2006 No. 149-FZ], ст. 15.8. 
17 Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации : Федеральный закон : 27 июля 
2006 г. № 149-ФЗ [Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information dated 27 
July 2006 No. 149-FZ], ч. 2.1 ст. 15.6, ч. 5 ст. 15.6-1, ч. 6, 8 ст. 15.8. 
18 Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации : Федеральный закон : 27 июля 
2006 г. № 149-ФЗ [Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information dated 27 
July 2006 No. 149-FZ], ч. 5 ст. 15.6-1. 
19 For more detailed discussion of the development of website blocking in Russia see Ruslan Nurullaev, ‘Website 
blocking in Russia: recent trends’ (2017) 33(2) Computer Law & Security Review 211. 
20 Александр Жаров, ‘Тезисы выступления А.А. Жарова на тему «Опыт Российской Федерации по защите 
авторских прав в национальном сегменте сети “Интернет”’ [Alexander Zharov, ‘Summary of the speech of A.A. 
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On the other hand, current legislation does have its shortcomings. As discussed in this 
section, Article 1253.1 of the Civil Code does not clearly define and classify information 
intermediaries, the conditions for substantive ISP liability, and safe harbour requirements for 
different types of ISPs. 
Website blocking also demonstrates limited effectiveness. After blocking of Rutracker, one 
of the largest BitTorrent index and tracker in Russia, despite the apparent reduction of the number 
of users, the file-sharing activity on the tracker decreased by no more than 10%.21 More generally, 
not fewer than 65% of websites which have been blocked for users in Russia continue to operate.22 
 
2. Russia’s global license proposal 
 
The Russia’s Ministry of Culture experts stated that, in practice, the measures provided in 
the current framework are ‘highly ineffective and do not allow to fundamentally resolve the 
problem of internet piracy’.23 Nikita Mikhalkov, the President of the Council of the Russian Union 
of Right-Holders (RUR), a collecting society for the private copying levy suggested that ‘the 
current [online copyright enforcement] legislation is not working’.24 
                                                 
Zharov on the topic “Experience of the Russian Federation in protection of authors’ rights in the national segment of 
the Internet”] (Роскомнадзор, 25 March 2016) <https://rkn.gov.ru/docs/03-21-2016_Tezisy_Kitaj_ZHarov.pdf> 
accessed 10 July 2016, 4. 
21 Андрей Фролов, ‘Администрация Rutracker признала падение посещаемости вдвое за год «вечной» 
блокировки’ [Andrey Frolov, ‘Administraction of Rutracker acknowledged decrease in website visits by fifty per 
cent after the year of “permanent” blocking’] (Vc.ru, 23 January 2017) <https://vc.ru/21481-rutracker-admin-
50percent> accessed 27 March 2018. 
22 Дада Линделл, Анна Балашова, Ирина Ли, ‘В России продолжили работать 65% заблокированных сайтов’ 
[Dada Lindell, Anna Balashova, Irina Li, ‘65% of blocked websites continue to operate in Russia’] (РБК, 16 February 
2017) <https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/16/02/2017/588619a59a79473089dbad69> accessed 29 March 
2018. 
23 ‘Сводный отчет о проведении оценки регулирующего воздействия к проекту федерального закона «О 
внесении изменений в Гражданский кодекс Российской Федерации в части совершенствования оборота 
результатов интеллектуальной деятельности в информационно-телекоммуникационных сетях»’ [Summary 
report on the conduct of the assessment of the regulatory impact of the draft Federal Law “On Amendment of the Civil 
Code of the Russian Federation with Regard to Improving of Circulation of the Results of Intellectual Activity in 
Information-Telecommunication Networks”] (Федеральный портал проектов нормативных правовых актов) 
<regulation.gov.ru/Files/GetFile?fileid=5b47c1c3-e0d4-47eb-b5ad-5c61e32cf552> accessed 29 March 2018. 
24 Матвей Алексеев, Светлана Поворазнюк, ‘«Мы ни у кого ничего не хотим отбирать» Никита Михалков и 
Сергей Федотов о глобальной лицензии в интернете’ [Matvey Alexeev, Svetlana Povoraznyuk, ‘”We do not want 
to take anything from anyone” Nikita Mikhalkov and Sergey Fedotov on global license on the internet’] (Lenta.ru, 6 
April 2015) <https://lenta.ru/articles/2015/04/06/mikhalkovfedotov/> accessed 29 March 2018. 
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Dissatisfaction with the current legal framework motivated the RUR to prepare their 
‘global license’ proposal.25 The main idea behind this proposal was to allow internet users to freely 
share and download creative works online in exchange for a small fee payable together with the 
internet access fee. The accumulated money would then be distributed among right holders, taking 
into account the frequency of use of their works. 
Despite the fact that the global licence proposal was ultimately withdrawn, this being one 
of the few cases where, on a national level, a model of an alternative compensation system was 
debated, the Russian global license proposal merits a closer scrutiny. It should be noted that the 
global license proposal is not the first of its kind – similar initiatives have been suggested before, 
in particular, in France in 2005 and in Germany in 2009 (these proposals will be looked at in more 
detail in the next section of this paper). The fact that the global license proposal appeared in Russia 
in 2014 suggests that there is still a lack of consensus about the application of copyright laws 
online and the role of ISPs in facilitating monetisation of copyright works for the benefit of right 
holders. This is probably true not only for Russia, but also for the European Union where the 
recently proposed new Copyright Directive may impose additional obligations on online platforms 
that use user-generated content. 
In October 2014, Nikita Mikhalkov (who earlier successfully lobbied for the adoption of 
the private copying levy in respect of blank carriers) presented the concept of the global license, 
‘the new instrument of [IPR] management on the web’,26 to the President who then ordered the 
Russian Government to assess the feasibility of the scheme.27 A draft of the law was published for 
public consultation in February 2014 by the Ministry of Culture.28 It suggested to implement the 
                                                 
25 The draft of the proposed global license legislation is available at http://regulation.gov.ru/projects#npa=19565 
(Global License Draft Law). 
26 Анастасия Голицына, Ксения Болецкая, ‘Михалков готовит налог на пиратство’ [Anastasiya Golitsyna, 
Kseniya Boletskaya, ‘Mikhalkov is preparing a piracy tax’] (Vedomosti, 31 October 2014) 
<https://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2014/10/31/mihalkov-gotovit-nalog-na-piratstvo> accessed 29 March 
2018. 
27 Анастасия Голицына, ‘Шувалов поручил разработать законопроект об авторском сборе в интернете по 
предложению Михалкова’ [Anastasiya Golitsyna, ‘Shuvalov ordered to prepare a draft law on copyright levy for 
the internet based on Mikhalkov’s proposal’] (Vedomosti, 10 November 2014) 
<https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2014/11/10/shuvalov-poruchil-razrabotat-zakonoproekt-na-osnove> 
accessed 29 March 2018. 
28 Дарья Луганская, ‘Законопроект об антипиратском сборе опубликован для обсуждения’ [Darya Luganskaya, 
‘Draft law on the antipiracy levy has been published for discussion’] (РБК, 20 February 2014) 
<https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/20/02/2015/54e740bc9a7947b21f91cc76> accessed 29 March 2018. 
 
 8 
 
global license scheme by amending the provisions of Part 4 of Russia’s Civil Code which regulates 
intellectual property. 
The global license was to be granted by a state-accredited collective rights management 
organisation (ACRMO)29 and was intended to cover musical works, literary works, audio-visual 
works,30 recorded performances, and sound recordings.31 The draft law did not, however, bring 
other frequently used works such as compilations or computer programs within the scope of the 
global licence. 
This license was to initially apply to works of all right holders (whether national or foreign), 
even if they did not authorise the ACRMO to provide global licenses for their works.32 Right 
holders who did not wish to participate in the global license scheme could later apply to the 
ACRMO to opt out of the scheme. The ACRMO would be required to exclude the works of such 
right holders from the global license regime within one month of receiving a request.33 
The global license was to grant internet users the right to copy creative works into the 
memory of a personal computer as well as the right to make such works available.34 By entering 
into an internet access agreement with an internet access provider a person would be presumed to 
have agreed to acquire a global license (internet users would not be able to refuse its acquisition). 
Termination of the internet access agreement would then also mean the termination of the global 
license. 
All internet users would be required to pay additional fees to their internet access providers 
to cover the global licenses. Sergey Fedotov, the then General Director of the Russian Authors’ 
Society (another collective rights management organisation which supported the global license 
proposal) stated that global license fees could amount to five per cent of the cost of internet access 
                                                 
29 Article 1(4) of the Global License Draft Law. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid, Article 1(5). 
32 ibid, Article 1(3). 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid, Article 1(4). 
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services and mentioned the monthly payment of RUB 25 (circa £0.31 as of 27 March 2018) per 
one internet access services agreement.35 
Internet access providers would be responsible for collecting the global license fees from 
users. They would also have to sign agreements with the ACRMO in order to transfer moneys 
received from users to the ACRMO; the form of the agreement being approved by the 
Government.36 The ACRMO was then to distribute the accumulated funds to right holders; 
distribution of funds being, again, regulated by the Government.37 
Whilst the draft legislation was silent on this aspect, the Ministry of Culture proposed that 
remuneration could be distributed unevenly between right holders, depending on the type of 
creative work. This proposal was justified on the basis of different level of use of creative works. 
For example, in 2013, among the different types of downloaded content the share of use of audio-
visual works was 54%, musical works and sound recordings 38%, and literary works 8%.38 
The distribution of monies collected from internet access providers was to be based on a 
public register of creative works, established by the ACRMO.39 This register would allow right 
holders to provide additional information on their works, and it would be ACRMO’s responsibility 
to use reasonable endeavours to identify creative works and add them to the register.40 
The Government was to adopt bylaws to regulate: (1) the requirements related to the 
information on creative works contained in the register; and (2) the process of online publication 
of such information.41 
Internet access providers were to be required to ‘create technical conditions’42 facilitating 
the identification and assessment of creative works covered by the global licenses (probably 
                                                 
35 Наталья Баринова, Александр Малахов, ‘Сергей ФЕДОТОВ: получается, что нет бесхозных денег’ [Natalya 
Barinova, Alexander Malakhov ‘Sergey FEDOTOV: it turns out that there is no ownerless money’] (ТАСС, 8 
December 2014) <http://tass.ru/opinions/interviews/1630961> accessed 29 March 2018. 
36 Article 1(2) of the Global License Draft Law. 
37 ibid, Article 1(4). 
38 Дарья Луганская, ‘Кликнул – плати’ [Darya Luganskaya, ‘Clicked – pay’] (РБК, 10 December 2014) 
<http://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2014/12/10/56bd58499a7947299f72c5bf> accessed 29 March 2018. 
39 Article 1(4) of the Global License Draft Law. 
40 Article 1(1) of the Global License Draft Law. 
41 ibid. 
42 ibid, Article 1(4). 
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meaning the assessment of the use of such works), and they would be compensated for the 
respective expenses by the ACRMO.43  The draft law also stated that during the identification and 
assessment of creative works, users’ right to protection of private life would have to be respected.44 
The global license scheme was a radical measure which understandably created divisions. 
The scheme was supported by the Ministry of Culture (which coordinated the work on the draft 
law), collective rights management organisations, and right holders many of whom were affiliated 
with the collective rights management organisations.45 
At the same time, the proposal brought together numerous (sometimes unexpected) 
opponents, including the Ministry of Communications,46 the Ministry of Economic 
Development,47 Federal Antimonopoly Service,48 internet companies and right holders,49 and a 
number of other entities and organisations all of which provided their objections to the proposal. 
 
2.1. Arguments in support of global licenses 
Those who supported global licenses relied on the fact that right holders are currently 
unable to adequately monetise their works online. This is true for a range of interconnected 
reasons: (1) users use content illegally and do not want to pay for it, (2) website owners publish 
content illegally in order to attract users and gain money from advertising, (3) internet access 
providers do not commit direct infringements, but generally profit from copyright infringements, 
                                                 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid, Article 1(4). 
45 Андрей Лукинов, Соня Соколова, Юрий Ильин, ‘Глобальная лицензия: пиратство в масштабе Рунета’ 
[Andrey Lukinov, Sonya Sokolova, Yuriy Ilyin, ‘Global license: piracy on the scale of the Runet’] (Звуки.ру, 22 
March 2015) <http://www.zvuki.ru/R/P/35124/> accessed 29 March 2018. 
46 Дарья Луганская, ‘Минкомсвязи выступило против идеи Михалкова о налоге на интернет’ [Darya 
Luganskaya, ‘Ministry of Communications opposed the Mikhalkov’s idea about the internet tax’] (РБК, 4 December 
2014) <https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/04/12/2014/54805928cbb20ff0f85ac556> accessed 29 March 
2018. 
47 Анастасия Голицына, ‘МЭР раскритиковало идею антипиратского сбора в рунете’ [Anastasiya Golitsyna, 
‘Ministry of Economic Development criticised the idea of the antipiracy levy for the Runet’] (Vedomosti, 24 
November 2014) <http://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2014/11/24/mer-raskritikovalo-ideyu-
antipiratskogo-sbora-v-runete> accessed 29 March 2018. 
48 ‘ФАС выступила против идеи введения «антипиратского» сбора’ [‘Federal Antimonopoly Service opposed the 
idea of introduction of the “antipiracy” levy’] (РБК, 11 December 2014) 
<https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/548993572ae596e6880f6414> accessed 29 March 2018. 
49 Анастасия Голицына, ‘Интернет-компании объяснили Путину вред от антипиратского сбора’ [Anastasiya 
Golitsyna, ‘Internet companies explained to Putin the harm of the antipiracy levy’] (Vedomosti, 1 December 2014) 
<https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2014/12/01/internet-kompanii-i-pravoobladateli-vystupili-protiv-
naloga> accessed 29 March 2018. 
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and (4) internet search providers generally profit from illegal content because users use their 
services to locate illegal content and watch ads in the process. 
The implementation of global licenses could, therefore, benefit numerous stakeholders as 
the licences would simplify the interaction with right holders and decrease the burden currently 
placed on courts and the government. The advocates of the global license scheme presented it as 
a silver bullet which would improve the position of right holders as their revenues would increase 
together with the use of their works and, at the same time, provide internet users with access to 
more content for less. Those in support of global licenses also maintained that content publishers 
would compete not by speculative trading of content but by improving their services, and internet 
search providers would get more search requests and revenue from advertising. 
Overall, global licences were put forward as a better solution than conventional antipiracy 
legislation which tends focus on restriction of access to infringing content available online instead 
of provision of remuneration to right holders. According to the supporters of the global license 
proposal, it would allow for internet users to pay less for access to content and for right holders to 
receive more remuneration than they currently do.5051 
 
2.2. Arguments against global licenses 
Those opposing global licenses were concerned about the fact that these licenses were not 
to cover all creative works, and that they extended collective rights management without express 
permission of right holders – this being in direct contradiction with Russia’s WTO obligations.52 
In their opinion, such extended collective rights management infringed the rights of authors 
and right holders, and deprived them of the right to freely monetise their works. Moreover, they 
                                                 
50 Матвей Алексеев, Светлана Поворазнюк, ‘«Мы ни у кого ничего не хотим отбирать» Никита Михалков и 
Сергей Федотов о глобальной лицензии в интернете’ [Matvey Alexeev, Svetlana Povoraznyuk, ‘”We do not want 
to take anything from anyone” Nikita Mikhalkov and Sergey Fedotov on global license on the internet’] (Lenta.ru, 6 
April 2015) <https://lenta.ru/articles/2015/04/06/mikhalkovfedotov/> accessed 28 October 2018. 
51 It should be noted that a study conducted by IViR suggests that alternative remuneration systems (such as the global 
license) may be well-received by consumers and may also have certain positive effects compared with the traditional 
copyright model (see the next section of this paper). 
52 When joining the WTO the Russia’s representative promised to review the legal framework and eliminate non-
contractual management of rights by 2014, which did not happen, see Report of the Working Party on the Accession 
of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization (WT/ACC/RUS/70/Add.1 WT/MIN(11)/2/Add.1), 1218. 
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saw the designation of only one collective rights management organisation to administer the global 
license scheme to be a concern as it might cause antitrust issues and because such organisations 
are generally often perceived as lacking transparency.53 Indeed, the (now former) head of the 
Russian Authors’ Society which supported the global license proposal has been found guilty of 
fraud in connection with his management of the organisation’s property.54 
Moreover, opponents argued that internet access providers would not be able to use their 
resources to grow their networks and offer internet access services to new users. Instead, global 
licenses will impose an economic burden on them: internet access providers would need to incur 
great expenses to develop currently non-existent equipment to analyse the online use of creative 
works, and to acquire more data storage capacity to store information about such use.  
A major concern was the technical impossibility of monitoring and assessing the number 
of uses of creative works and, as a consequence, the inability to fairly distribute accumulated funds 
among right holders. 
In 2015, Giprosvyaz, the institute for design of structures for communications affiliated 
with Rostelecom, a major Russian telecommunications service provider, conducted a study on the 
technical viability of implementing the global license proposal.55 Giprosvyaz concluded that, at 
the time of the study, there was no widely available technology which would allow the monitoring 
and analysis of internet traffic of the kind envisaged by the global license proposal.56 In addition, 
the task of monitoring the use of creative works by internet users would be rendered more difficult 
due to: (1) growing use of HTTPS and other encrypted protocols (in 2015 encrypted traffic 
amounted to 10-15% of the total traffic and was expected to increase to 30% by 2017),57 (2) use 
                                                 
53 Анастасия Голицына, ‘Продюсеры требуют реформы обществ по коллективному управлению правами’ 
[Anastasiya Golitsyna, ‘Producers demand reform of the collective rights management societies’] (Vedomosti, 26 
November 2015) <https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2015/11/26/618522-prodyuseri> accessed 29 
March 2018. 
54 Маргарита Алехина, ‘Экс-глава РАО получил 1,5 года колонии за мошенничество с недвижимостью’ 
[Margarita Alyokhina, ‘Ex-head of Russian Authors’ Society was sentenced to 1.5 years of imprisonment for assets 
fraud’] (РБК, 19 June 2017) <https://www.rbc.ru/society/19/06/2017/5946db3c9a7947c2a318d621> accessed 29 
March 2018. 
55 ОАО «ГИПРОСВЯЗЬ», ‘ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ о возможности технической реализации Концепции глобального 
лицензирования на сетях операторов связи’ [JSC “GIPROSVYAZ”, ‘REPORT on the possibility of technical 
implementation of the Concept of global licensing on networks of telecom operators’] 
<http://www.slideshare.net/temychk/ss-45304834> accessed on 29 March 2018. 
56 ibid, 42. 
57 ibid, 38. 
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of peer-to-peer protocols, such as BitTorrent (peer-to-peer traffic amounting to 15% of the total 
traffic),58 and (3) use of security and anonymity software and technology, such as Tor or VPN, 
which do not permit to distinguish repeated downloads of the same work and, as a consequence, 
can be used to artificially increase the number of downloads.59 Accordingly, Giprosvyaz estimated 
that the effectiveness of calculating online use of creative works in 2015 would not exceed 70%, 
with a further potential decrease to 50% by 2017-2018.60 
At the same time, even if the available monitoring equipment was to be used, the cost of 
its purchase, installation, and maintenance would be prohibitively high. The Ministry of 
Communications estimated that all funds accumulated within the first 10 years from the 
implementation of the global license scheme would have to be spent to compensate the cost of 
purchase of such monitoring equipment.61 
Some commentators also criticised the scheme by pointing out that it would infringe a 
number of users’ rights. To increase the effectiveness of monitoring, it would be necessary to use 
more intrusive monitoring techniques,62 which could infringe users’ rights to protection of private 
life. Moreover, the duty imposed on internet access providers to share user data with the ACRMO 
would infringe privacy of communication. 
Users’ inability to refuse accepting global licenses might also infringe their freedom to 
contract, and create implications under consumer protection legislation. Many users could also 
find themselves liable to pay the global license fees twice or even multiple times as such licenses 
were not to be granted per internet user but, instead, per every internet access services agreement 
a person has entered into. After all, one person can have more than one internet access agreement: 
                                                 
58 ibid, 39. 
59 ibid, 20. 
60 ibid, 39. 
61 Дарья Луганская, ‘Минсвязи предсказало банкротство кинотеатров при введении сбора Михалкова’ [Darya 
Luganskaya, ‘Ministry of Communications predicted bankruptcy of cinemas after introduction of the Mikhalkov 
levy’] (РБК, 25 December 2014) 
<https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/25/12/2014/549be1079a79474181277281> accessed 29 March 2018. 
62 For example, Systematika, the organisation requested by the Ministry of Culture to design conceptual technical 
implementation of the monitoring of the use of works, proposed that special monitoring software should be installed 
on users’ computers, see Никита Лихачев ‘Для реализации антипиратского сбора Михалкова предложили 
снимать копию трафика пользователей и ставить им «жучки»’ [Nikita Likhachev, ‘Copying of user traffic and 
“bugging” were proposed for implementation of Mikhalkov’s antipiracy levy’] (TJ, 20 February 2015) 
<https://tjournal.ru/54143-mikhalkov-traffic-copy-agents> accessed 29 March 2018. 
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for example, one covering internet access via his/her smartphone, and another to provide 
broadband connection for his/her home personal computer. 
Finally, some critics have also pointed out that the global license concept was based on a 
false assumption that all online use of content is infringing. They pointed out that the proposal 
disregarded the fact that a significant part of creative works used online is used with permission 
of right holders, under licences (including open licenses), or because the works have entered the 
public domain. Use of creative works online can also fall under one of the available copyright 
exceptions, in particular under the private use exception which already, indirectly, requires internet 
users to pay a levy. 
Amidst the heated discussions between the advocates and critics of the scheme, in June 
2015, the Russian media have reported that the global license initiative has been removed from the 
list of issues monitored by the President’s administration.63 Whilst the withdrawal of the 
President’s support did not formally preclude the Ministry of Culture from continuing its work on 
the proposal, it has, arguably, led to the abandonment of the global license scheme. 
Similarly, in the EU the Court of Justice of the European Union already addressed some of 
these concerns directly on some systems which appear to be very similar to the ones that would be 
needed in order to implement the global license system. In Promusicae64 underlined how national 
authorities and courts have to strike a fair balance between the protection of copyright and the 
protection of the fundamental rights of individuals who these measures affect. In Scarlet65, the 
CJEU ruled that the suggested filtering system was disproportionate and collided with Art. 15 of 
the E-commerce Directive, and later in Netlog66, expanding on similar reasoning added that these 
general filtering system challenged several fundamental rights protected under the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including the ISP’s freedom to conduct their business, 
users’ right to the protection of their personal data and would put at risk the freedom of 
information.67 
                                                 
63 Анастасия Голицына, ‘Путин не поддержал идею авторского сбора в интернете’ [Anastasiya Golitsyna, ‘Putin 
did not support the idea of copyright levy on the internet’] (Vedomosti, 24 June 2015) 
<https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2015/06/24/597866-putin-ne-podderzhal-ideyu-avtorskogo-sbora-v-
internete> accessed 29 March 2018. 
64 C-275/06 Promusicae v Telefonica de Espana SAU. 
65 C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL. 
66 C-360/10 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV. 
67 For further analysis of these cases see, for instance, Teunissen, P. [2018], The balance puzzle: the ECJ's method of 
proportionality review for copyright injunctions, 40(9) E.I.P.R. 579-593. 
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3. The last of a - very long - series of proposals 
Despite the controversies surrounding the proposal, the Russian global license was neither 
the first, nor will it be the last, proposal to address the ever-growing problem of online 
infringement via a collection of pre-existing tools available to copyright owners - namely (1) the 
collective management of the right of making available and (2) a remuneration system to address 
the harm caused by infringements of the reproduction right. These proposals have come in a 
number of different forms and names: alternative compensation system, content or kultur flat-rate, 
licence globale, artistic freedom voucher, non-commercial use levy, and sharing licence.  
One of earliest proposal was Netanel’s suggestion to allow users to share files and 
compensating copyright owners with a levy on products and services benefitting from file-
sharing,68 followed by Ku’s suggestion of introducing a levy on internet service subscriptions.69 
Others, like Gervais, suggested modifying existing collective licensing to extend it to file-
sharing,70 subjecting the making available right to mandatory collective management.71 Aigrain 
included the application of extended collective licence schemes in the different possible legal 
solutions to unauthorised file-sharing,72 Fisher, in his administrative compensation system, 
suggested replacing copyright law with a voluntary licence and a ‘tax’.73 Lessig proposed the 
temporary introduction of a similar system until licensed streaming replaced file-sharing.74 Litman 
                                                 
68 N.W. Netanel, ‘Impose a non-commercial use levy to allow free P2P file sharing’, (2003) 17 J.O.L.T. 1. 
69 Ku, R.S.R. [2002], ‘The creative destruction of copyright: Napster and the new economics of digital technology’, 
[2002] 69 University of Chicago L.Rev. 263, 311-315; Ku, R.S.R. [2003], ‘Consumers and creative destruction: fair 
use beyond market failure’, 18 B.T.L.J. 539, 566. 
70 Gervais, D.J. [2005], ‘The price of social norms: towards a licensing regime for file-sharing’, 12 J.I.P.L. 39. 
71 This solution would keep the exclusive author’s right in place and only limit the exercise of this right. Grassmuck, 
V. [2009] ‘The World is Going Flat(-Rate)’ (IP Watch, 11 May 2009, <https://www.ip-watch.org/2009/05/11/the-
world-is-going-flat-rate/> and Guibault,, L. and others, The future of levies in a digital environment: final report 
(Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law, 2003), 26-27 
72 Aigrain, P. [2008], ‘Internet & création-Comment reconnaître des echanges sur l’internet en finançant la creation? 
Inlibroveritas. NEXA, the Centre for Internet & Society at the Polytechnic of Torino, shared Aigrain’s view. See 
NEXA [2009], ‘Position paper on file-sharing and extended collective licensing. nexa.polito.it/licenzecollettive. 
[12/08/2010]. 
73 W.W Fisher, Promises to keep: technology, law and the future of entertainment, 2004 Stanford University Press. 
74 Lessing agrees with Fisher’s proposal, but he anticipate the system would only serve for the interim. Lessig, L. 
[2004], Free culture: how big media uses technology and the law to lock down culture and control creativity, (Penguin 
Press, 2004. 300-04. He argued that file-sharing should be should be addressed with a system of compulsory licenses 
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suggested that copyright owners should choose between authorising the ‘sharing’ of their works 
and being compensated by a blanket fee or levy/tax; and ‘hoarding’ their works in exclusively 
exploited, online ventures, DRM-secured.75 Lincoff proposed the creation of an ‘online 
transmission right for musical works and sound recordings’,76 which would combine the rights of 
reproduction, performance, and distribution. The Songwriters Association of Canada suggested 
introducing a right covering the sharing of music using any technology: the right to share ‘a copy 
of a copyrighted musical work without motive of financial gain’.77 Dimita suggested the 
introduction and global implementation of a reasonable and unobtrusive remuneration right to 
cover for the unauthorised online dissemination of protected works: a ‘positive’ remuneration right 
for authors and copyright owners, centrally and collectively administered, which would compress 
and specify the condition under which the communication to the public and the reproduction rights 
might be exercised.78 Until 2013 Grassmuck collected all these proposals advanced by academics, 
industry experts, consumer and user organisations, collecting societies and political parties. On his 
website - the ‘sharing licenses library’- he notes that they are ‘as old as P2P file-sharing itself'.79 
A multidisciplinary study of alternative remuneration systems conducted by IViR, 
University of Amsterdam’s Institute for Information Law,80 revealed that alternative remuneration 
systems may be well-received by consumers as they are willing to experiment with alternative 
modes of access and compensation. In addition to that, such systems may also allow to tackle 
concentration of market power and licensing issues which are characteristic for traditional 
copyright model. 81 
                                                 
similar to the one for cable retransmission, the fee being set by the governments striking the right balance. Ibid. 254-
55. 
75 Litman, J. [2004], Sharing and stealing, 27(1) Hastings Communications &Entertainment Law Journal, 1-50. 
76 Lincoff, B. [2002], Full, fair and feasible solution to the dilemma of online music licensing, 
www.bennettlincoff.com/music.pdf. 
77 Songwriters Association of Canada [2009], ‘Proposal for the monetization of the file-sharing of music’. 
www.songwriters.ca/studio/proposal.php. [01/12/2009-No longer available]. 
78 G. Dimita, Copyright and Shared Networking Technologies 2010 
https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/1303  
79 http://www.vgrass.de/?p=1048. For a more updated list see http://acs-companion.tumblr.com/lit. 
80 Quintais, J.P., Copyright in an Age of Access: Alternatives to Copyright Enforcement (Kluwer Law International, 
2017). See <https://www.ivir.nl/projects/copyright-in-an-age-of-access-alternatives-to-copyright-enforcement/> 
accessed 12 April 2018.    
81 IViR, ‘International Symposium on Alternative Compensation Systems for Digital Copyright’ (IViR, 11 July 2015) 
<https://www.ivir.nl/international-symposium-on-alternative-compensation-systems/> accessed 12 April 2018. 
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3.1. The French Licence Globale 
The most famous of the alternative remuneration proposals – and the only precedent to the 
Russian proposal when it comes to parliamentarian discussion – was the French ‘licence globale’ 
of 2005 which, similarly to its Russian equivalent, sparked a heated debate and was eventually 
abandoned. The proposal envisaged the adoption of a remuneration system for peer-to-peer global 
file-sharing on the basis of a mandatory contractual licence combined with a statutory licence, and 
administered by a mandatory collective administration, a ‘global licence’.82 The French proposal 
was deeply studied by academics worldwide and, importantly, was deemed feasible by one of the 
most extensive studies on the topic which also deemed it to be in conformity with international 
treaties.83 The study concluded that, adapting the existing system of remuneration, downloading 
could be covered by the private copying exception, and further suggested a mandatory collective 
management for the ‘making available’ right. It also emphasised the efficiency of the precedent 
collective managements for reprography and cable broadcast.84 Of the opposite view was the 
International Literary and Artistic Association, ALAI, which, with a resolution adopted in 2006,85 
condemned it as being in conflict with international treaties. 
The proposal was promoted by the Alliance Public-Artistes,86 and was supported by 
politicians from very different backgrounds. The Alliance Public-Artistes commissioned two 
                                                 
82 Mazziotti, G., EU Digital Copyright Law and the End-User (Springer Science & Business Media, 2008) 261. 
83 Bernault, C. and Lebois, A., ‘Peer-to-peer File Sharing and Literary and Artistic Property’ 
<http://privatkopie.net/files/Feasibility-Study-p2p-acs_Nantes.pdf> accessed 9 April 2018.  
84 Ibid. 48 
85 See L’Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale at http://www.alai.org.   
86 Alliance Public-Artistes, Campagne de sensibilisation au projet de loi DADVSI’ 
<http://www.lalliance.org/pages/1_1.html> accessed 12 August 2010. 
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studies on the feasibility of the model from a technical87 and economic88 perspective. The proposal 
implementing the licence globale was subsequently discussed89 but, ultimately, was not included 
in the final version of the French law on authors' rights and related rights in the information society, 
the so-called DAVDSI law.90 At the time, the Association Litteraire et Artistique Internationale 
issues a resolution warning for the ‘utmost circumspection with regard to every proposal to replace 
copyright’s primary basis in the private law model of an exclusive right by models based on 
statutory remunerations’.91 
 
3.2. The German Kultur Flat-rate 
Even though it never received parliamentary discussion, it is definitely worth adding to the 
analysis the levy-based file-sharing permission proposed by the German Green political party in 
their campaign for the 2009 European Parliament Elections.92 The German Social Democrats 
Political Party (SPD) followed the Green lead, introduced a similar proposal in their draft for the 
                                                 
87 BigChampagne Online Media Measurement, ‘Monitoring and Identifying P2P Media’ 
<http://alliance.bugiweb.com/usr/documents/etudespedidambigchampagne-en-janv2006.pdf> accessed 12 August 
2010. 
88 Alliance Public-Artistes, ‘PRESS KIT: Downloading and sharing files on the Internet, An alliance against legal 
proceedings, An alliance for a global licence’ <http://www.alliance.bugiweb.com/usr/Documents/PressKit-
June2005.pdf> accessed 12 August 2010. 
89 Orlowski, A., ‘France votes to legalize flat-fee P2P downloads’ (The Register, 22 December 2005) 
<www.theregister.co.uk/2005/12/22/france_legal_p2p_flat_fee> accessed 12 April 2018. 
90 The law was passed in 2006 to reform French copyright law, mostly in order to implement the European Copyright 
Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC). Loi no 2006-961 du 1er août 2006 relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins 
dans la société de l’information. 
91 RESOLUTION FOLLOWING THE 2015 BONN CONGRESS OF ALAI, Rome, 14 September 2016. 
http://www.alai.org/en/assets/files/resolutions/20160914-resolution-Bonn_en.pdf accessed 20 May 2015 
92 Europawahlprogramm (vorläufig, Stand: 31.01.09), Point VIII: Kultur, Bildung und Forschung–Der GRÜNE Weg 
in die Wissenschaftsgesellschaft, 29 Ordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, Dortmund, 23-25 January 2009, 
<www.gruene-partei.de/cms/default/dokbin/267/267132.kapitel_viii_kultur_bildung_und_forschun.pdf> accessed 
12 August 2010. ‘Compensation for artistic contributions on the internet. We want to develop a fair process to 
compensate artists for the dissemination on the internet or elsewhere of their works. In the digital era, we need to 
strengthen the rights of consumers. We are committed to a differentiated solution that may include an all-inclusive 
fee for music, movies and other media and content. The introduction of a culture-flat-rate, which allows the use of 
digital cultural assets for non-commercial use, can be a solution for this. The revenue must come transparently and 
equitably in the first place to the authors’ own benefit. We clearly reject the current massive wave of legal action, 
interference with privacy, the use of DRM or data traffic filters. They are a disproportionate interference with the 
users’ rights. Translation by J.L.A. Himmrich, reproduced with consent. 
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national election.93 According to the proposal, users would pay a flat rate for the right to share, 
and an online collecting society would pay authors and publishers according to the measured use 
of their works. The minimal requirement for such a solution should be:94 
1. a licence permitting users to share protected works for non-commercial purposes; 
2. a flat-rate levy, possibly collected by the internet access provider; and 
3. a collective management system. 
This approach would limit the possibility to enforce copyrights against users, but the 
copyright owners would be compensated in the form of an equitable remuneration. From an 
economic perspective, this could be argued to be an improvement over the current situation where 
copyright owners are not compensated for the unauthorised dissemination of their works over the 
internet.95 The German Green party also commissioned a study on the legal feasibility of this 
approach.96 The conclusion was positive and a number of scholars,97 representatives from the 
music industry,98 collecting societies’ advisors,99 and activists100 supported the Kultur flat-rate 
considering it to be the only meaningful solution to the problem of illegal file-sharing. 
 
                                                 
93 Entwurf des regierungsprogramms der SPD. Antrag des SPD-Parteivorstandes an den Bundersparteitag der SPDD 
am 14 June 2009, 48, <http://www.frankwaltersteinmeier.de/_media/pdf/Entwurf_Regierungsprogramm.pdf> 
accessed 12 August 2010. Fair remuneration for creative work. As part of the social democratic creative-package, 
we wants to ensure that cultural and media professionals, artists can live from their creative work. It depends on the 
intellectual property to protect and compensate them adequately. It is important to protect intellectual property and 
to remunerate it appropriately. Copyright and copyright contract law should allow a decent income from the 
exploitation of intellectual property in the digital environment. The future of digitization brings new challenges in the 
protection of intangible products and goods. We need a reasonable balance between usability and the rights of the 
creators. In the framework of the creative-package, we will involve network operators and internet service providers 
in a dialogue with rights holders and collecting societies. We are committed to the examination of a culture flat-rate’. 
Translation by J. Himmrich, reproduced with consent. 
94 Roßnagel, A., director of the ‘Institut für Europäisches Medienrecht in Zusammenarbeit mit der Projektgruppe 
verfassungsverträgliche Technikgestaltung an der Universität Kassel’ (hereinafter EML), cited in Grassmuck, V. 
[2009], op.cit. 
95 Grassmuck, V. [2009], op.cit. 
96 EML [2009], ‘Die Zulässigkeit einer Kulturflatrate nach nationalem und europäischem Recht’, 
www.boersenblatt.net/sixcms/media.php/747/ kulturflatrate.pdf. [12/08/2010] 
97 For instance, Hoeren (www.webseiten-infos.de/youtube-und-das-urheberrecht); Flechsig (blog.beck. 
de/2008/08/12/flechsig-und-die-flatrate); Wandtke (waste.informatik.hu-berlin.de/grassmuck/Texts/08-03_state-of-
flatrate.html); and Peukert (www.heise.de/newsticker/digital-rights-management-welche-alternativen-sind-rechtlich-
moeglich/meldung/55150). [12/08/2010]. 
98 For instance, Renner (www.merkur.de/2008_40__eine_loesung_is.30479.0.html?&no_cache=1). [12/08/2010]. 
99 For instance, Leonhard (www.mediafuturist.com/music_like_water). [12/08/2010]. 
100 For instance, http://privatkopie.net and www.fairsharing.de. [12/08/2010]. 
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4. Conformity with international obligations 
Most of the criticisms raised against these proposals focus on the lack of conformity with 
international treaties, the complexity in administering such systems, calculation of the levy, and 
privacy issues. However, the complexity of a system and/or calculation of a levy should not, of 
themselves, be used as an incontestable argument against a proposal. After all, any system of 
collective management is, by its nature, complex and imprecise – this has never been an obstacle 
to implementation. Similarly, as regards the levy calculation, there are systems already in place in 
every jurisdiction that allow to establish the optimal rate. The privacy concern is more important, 
but it could be easily solved by non-intrusive and anonymous monitoring – an accurate system 
requires the monitoring of the number of times a work has been shared and the volume of sharing 
per user. There is no need to connect the actual work with identified users – anonymization could 
easily address any privacy concern. This leaves us with the issue of conformity with international 
obligations.  
Every proposal must conform to the obligations under Berne, TRIPs, WCT, and WPPT 
Treaties. In particular, it must comply with the three-steps-test by which (1) limitations on 
exclusive copyrights are confined to 'certain special cases' which (2) do not conflict with a 'normal 
exploitation of the work' and (3) do not 'unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author’.101 Most of the aforementioned proposals rarely deal with this aspect.102 Lessig 
acknowledges that ‘some of the changes’ he proposes would require amendments to, ‘or the 
abrogation of some treaties’.103 Fisher admits that his proposed limitation to exclusive rights 
necessitates amendments to Berne and TRIPs.104 Litman herself doubts her proposal is three-step-
                                                 
101 Gervais, D.J. [2005], ‘Towards a new core international copyright norm: the reverse three-step-test’, 9 Marquette 
Intellectual Property L.Rev. 1, 33. Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], ‘Toward supranational copyright law? The WTO panel 
decision and the ‘three-step-test’ for copyright exceptions’, 187 R.I.D.A 3. Sirinelli, P. [1999], ‘Exceptions and limits 
to copyright and neighbouring rights’, Workshop on Implementation Issues of the WCT and the WPPT, WIPO 
Document WCT-WPPT/IMP/1 of 3 December 1999, 42. Peukert, A., ‘A bipolar copyright system for the digital 
network environment’, in Strowel, A., Peer-to-peer file sharing and secondary liability in copyright law (Edward 
Elgar, 2009) 148-176. 
102 Lunney, G.S. [2001], The death of copyright: digital technology, private copying, and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act’, [2001] 87 Virginia L Rev, 813, 910-918; Sobel, L.S. [2003], Symposium: the law and economics of 
digital rights management: DRM as an enabler of business models: ISPs as digital retailers, 18 B.T.L.J. 667, 673; Ku, 
R.S.R. [2002], op.cit. 311-315; and [2003], op.cit. 566. Lemley, M.A. and Reese, R.A. [2004] ‘Reducing Digital 
Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation’, 56 Stanford Law Review, 1345, 1414-31. The exception is 
Eckersley, who discussed in details Article 13 of TRIPS. Eckersley, P. [2004] ‘Virtual markets for virtual goods: the 
mirror image of digital copyright?’ 18 J.O.L.T. 85152-158. 
103 Lessig, L. [2004], op.cit., 251.  
104 Fisher proposed a new 17 U.S.C. §107A. Fisher, W.W. [2004], op.cit. 247.  
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test compliant.105 Netanel merely states that his levy is TRIPs-compliant.106 The issue is not just 
theoretical107 - the German Ministry of Justice declined to introduce a new limitation for non-
commercial file-sharing, explicitly referring to the three-step test.108 This does not mean that such 
treaties are not perfectible. However, the complexity of the procedure and the required consensus 
of all contracting parties for amendments makes any sort of modification to international treaties 
appear unrealistic.109 Therefore, a proposal drawing a limitation/exception to one of the exclusive 
rights – which are ‘mandatory minimum rights in international copyright law’110 – has to be subject 
to the three-step test.111 This test, in its TRIPs version, states: 
Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain 
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.112 
These steps are considered cumulatively113 and successively.114 
                                                 
105 Litman, J.C. [2004], Sharing and stealing, 27(1) Hastings Communications &Entertainment Law Journal, 1-50, 39. 
106 Netanel, N.W. [2003], Impose a non commercial use levy to allow free P2P file sharing, 17 J.O.L.T. 1,. 60. 
107 Peukert, A. [2009], A bipolar copyright system for the digital network environment, in Strowel, A. [2009] Peer-to-
peer file sharing and secondary liability in copyright law, Edward Elgar, 148-176. 
108 BMJV, Bill for a ‘2nd Act on Copyright in the Information Society’, 27 September 2004, 33-34. See 
<http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/630f712008607f2bf49cde66e5a84046/760/referentenentwurf_urheberr.pdf> 
accessed 14 August 2010. 
109 On the difficulties to amend the TRIPS Agreement, see Gervais, D.J. [2005], Towards a new core international 
copyright norm: the reverse three-step test’, 9 Marquette I.P.L.Rev. 1 (‘Far from simple politically’); Gervais, D.J. 
[2005], ‘The price of social norms: towards a licensing regime for file-sharing’, 12 J.I.P.L. 39. (‘Any proposal to 
license P2P should take account of applicable international treaties’). Eckersley, P. [2004], Virtual markets for virtual 
goods: the mirror image of digital copyright? 18 J.O.L.T. 85, 157. 
110 Article 9 Berne, Article 9(1) TRIPS, agreed statement concerning Article 1(4) WCT; Articles 11, 11bis(1), 11ter(1), 
14(1), 14bis(1) Berne, Article 8 WCT, Articles 10, 14 WPPT. 
111 Article 9(2) Berne and later in Article 13 TRIPS, Article 10 WCT and Article 16(2) WPPT. Ricketson, S. [2003], 
‘WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment’, WIPO 
publication SCCR/9/7. 
112 Article 13. 
113 Failure to comply with any one of the three conditions results in the limitation/exception being disallowed. WTO 
Panel, Dispute DS160, §110(5) US Copyright Act, 7 January 2002, Para. 6.74, 6.97 Reinbothe, Jörg and von Lewinski, 
Silke, The WIPO treaties 1996 (Butterworths 2002), Article 10 WCT no. 14. Ricketson, S. [2003], WIPO study on 
limitations and exceptions of copyright and related rights in the digital environment, WIPO publication SCCR/9/7. 
114 Records of the WCT negotiations, reproduced in Ficsor, M. [2002], The law of copyright and the internet-The 1996 
WIPO Treaties, their interpretation and implementation (OUP 2002) 71; and in Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], Toward 
supranational copyright law? The WTO panel decision and the “three-step test” for copyright exceptions’, 187 R.I.D.A 
3, 40. Moreover, the interpretation of the test must take into consideration the aim of the instruments which include 
it. This aim was to harmonise national laws in order to provide for adequate, balanced copyright protection.With 
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Divergent opinions exist as to what this requirement means in detail. A restriction must be 
‘clearly defined and narrow in its scope’.115 The scope has to be ‘known and particularised’ so that 
it is foreseeable whether or not a given use will be subject to the limitation/exception.116 Moreover, 
the scope has to be ‘narrow’, both in a qualitative and in a quantitative sense.117 This can, however, 
be read in a number of alternative ways. For instance, it has been suggested that ‘certain special 
cases’ should relate to the legitimacy of the policy rationale rather than to the extent of the coverage 
of the exception.118 On the other hand, it seems clear that this condition does not rule out various 
other concepts, such as fair dealing or fair use – it is ‘an incalculable, shapeless provision 
exempting a wide variety of different uses’ that is deemed impermissible.119 Concerning the 
‘specialness’ of the limitation or exception, various commentators question whether some clear 
reason of public policy, a rational basis for justification exists for the restriction,120 or whether 
users’ interests need to be reconciled with the copyright owner’s interests.121 The WTO Panel 
considered the public policy issue of subsidiary relevance in applying the first step.122 It could be 
argued, however, that a limitation/exception for private non-commercial uses is clearly defined 
                                                 
regard to Berne, Ficsor, M. [2002], op.cit. 5.06-8; regarding Article 7-8 TRIPS, WTO Panel, DS114 Canada-Patent 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 18 August 2000, Para. 7.26; regarding the WCT, Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. 
Reinbothe-von Lewinski [2002], op.cit. Article 10 WCT. 
115 Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. WTO Panel, Dispute DS160, §110(5) US Copyright Act, 7 January 2002, Para. 6.112; 
Ficsor, M. [2002], op.cit. 129, 227; Reinbothe-von Lewinski, [2002], op.cit. Article 10 WCT, 15. With regard to 
Article 30 TRIPS (‘limited exceptions’), WTO Panel, DS114 Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 
18 August 2000, Para. 7.30. Ficsor, M. [2002], op.cit. 151 (extensive use of compulsory licensing not in line with 
Article 13 TRIPS). 
116 WTO Panel, Dispute DS160, §110(5) US Copyright Act, 7 January 2002, Para. 6.108; Senftleben, M., Copyright, 
Limitations and the Three-step test. An Analysis of the Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law 
(Kluwer Law International, 2004)137. 
117 Ibid. 
118 See, for instance, Griffiths, J. [2010], Rhetoric & the ‘three-step-test’: copyright reforms in the United Kingdom, 
32(7) E.I.P.R. 309-312. Ficsor, M. [2002], How Much of What? R.I.D.A. 111, Senftleben, [2004], Copyright, 
limitations and the three step test: an analysis of the three step test in the international and EC copyright Law, Kluwer 
Law International, 144-152; He, H. [2009], Seeking a Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step Test: an Adjusted 
Structure in View of Divergent Approaches I.I.C. 274. 
119 Senftleben, M. [2004], op.cit. 133-137. Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. Gervais argues that only the second and third 
step really embody a restriction to future limitations and exceptions, because few countries would act in a purely 
arbitrary way introducing exceptions that imply a complete repeal of copyright law. Gervais, D.J. [2005], op.cit. 17. 
120 Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. Ficsor, M. [2002], op.cit. 129-32. Reinbothe-von Lewinski, [2002], op.cit. Article 10 
WCT no. 15. 
121 Senftleben, M. [2004], op.cit. 144-152. Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. 
122 WTO Panel, Dispute DS160, §110(5) US Copyright Act, 7 January 2002, Para. 6.102-13; Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], 
‘Toward supranational copyright law? The WTO panel decision and the “three-step test” for copyright exceptions’, 
187 R.I.D.A 339-43. 
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and narrow in scope and can easily be distinguished from non-permitted uses.123 Consequently, it 
could, theoretically, constitute a ‘certain special case’.124 
‘Normal exploitation’ refers to what a copyright owner may expect from present or future 
(potential) markets.125 However, this is open to contrasting interpretations. For instance, with the 
increasing availability of ways to exercise economic rights, the range of ‘normal’ exploitations 
increases with the consequent decrease of the margins for the introduction, or even maintenance, 
of limitations and exceptions. Therefore, when defining the second step, it should be accepted that 
a ‘conflict’ should arise only when the exception ‘substantially impair[s] … the overall 
commercialisation of that work by divesting the authors of a major source of income’;126 and that 
‘normal’ exploitation is not the full use of an exclusive right. Otherwise, every restriction would 
be impermissible, and thus the provision itself superfluous. ‘Normal’ implies an empirical and a 
normative element.127 Regarding the degree of market displacement following from the restriction, 
different standards have been articulated. It has been maintained that a limitation/exception 
conflicts with normal exploitation if:128 
• it causes a serious loss of profit;  
• it covers uses for which the author would ordinarily expect to receive a fee;  
• it applies to those forms of exploitation that currently generate significant or tangible 
revenue or which, with a certain degree of likelihood and plausibility, could acquire 
considerable economic or practical importance as opposed to uses that do not compete with 
non-exempted uses (actual and potential effects). 
On this point, a passage from Grokster is interesting: 
one striking example provided by the software distributors is the popular band 
Wilco, whose record company had declined to release one of its albums on the basis 
                                                 
123 Peukert, A. [2009], op.cit. 163-4; Lessig, L. [2004], op.cit. 296-7. Senftleben, M. [2004], op.cit. 140-4, 162. 
124 EML [2009], ‘Die Zulässigkeit einer Kulturflatrate nach nationalem und europäischem Recht’, 
www.boersenblatt.net/sixcms/media.php/747/ kulturflatrate.pdf. 27. 
125 Mazziotti, G. [2008], op.cit. 83. 
126 Senftleben, M. [2004], op.cit. 193. 
127 Peukert, A. [2009], op.cit. 165. 
128 Ibid. 
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that it had no commercial potential. Wilco repurchased the work from the record 
company and made the album available for free downloading, both from its own 
website and through the software user networks. The result sparked widespread 
interest and, as a result, Wilco received another recording contract.129 
Thus, experience shows that ‘normal exploitation’ is not eliminated if the work had already 
been available on networks. As has been highlighted, the second-step analysis would be better if 
complemented by ‘market research to draw concrete conclusions’.130 Nevertheless, it is submitted 
that ‘normal exploitation’ should not refer to a particular business model. Thus, if a new alternative 
method of exploitation, differently compensated, became ‘normal’, the limitation that allows it 
might then be argued to comply with the second step.131 
Lately, the question was raised of whether non-economic considerations should be taken 
into account, in particular, the public interest. In fact, a pure economic approach would too often 
paralyse any application of limitation and exception in the digital environment.132 This reading 
appears to break radically with the traditional interpretation of the second step, and would 
practically diminish the importance of the third step.133 However, the authors of this paper are of 
the view that user initiated dissemination of information is a democratic necessity that needs to be 
balanced with the rights of the authors and other copyright owners.134 
The third step requires limitations to be ‘justifiable’ and ‘reasonably’ supported by public 
policies or other social needs.135 The crucial questions are therefore concerned with whether the 
interests at stake are legitimate, and at which point the level of ‘prejudice’ may become 
                                                 
129 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court did not refer to this 
example expressly but stated that ‘some musical performers […] have gained new audiences by distributing their 
copyrighted works for free across peer-to-peer networks […]’. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. 125 S.Ct. 2764, 
2772 (2005). 
130 Grassmuck, V. [2009] op.cit. 
131 EML [2009], op.cit. 
132 Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], op.cit. 48-52; Senftleben, M. [2004], op.cit. fn.9, 181 
133 Lucas, A. [2010], For a reasonable interpretation of the three-step test, 32(6) E.I.P.R., 277-282. 
134 See, in this sense, Netanel, N.W. [1996], op.cit.; Senftleben, [2004], op.cit. 33-34. 
135 WTO Panel, Dispute DS160, §110(5) US Copyright Act, 7 January 2002, Para. 7.69; Gervais, D.J. [2005], op.cit. 
19-20. 
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‘unreasonable’.136 Nevertheless, the introduction of a levy-based compensation system appears to 
respond to this requirement.137 In a sense, a remuneration system rebalances the prejudice making 
‘reasonable’ what would otherwise be ‘unreasonable’, if left uncompensated:138 
The interests of authors and exploiters of the third step have to be weighed against 
the interests of the general public and against possible alternatives. Assuming an 
appropriate remuneration […] the prejudice would not be unreasonable.139 
The above analysis is controversial, and some commentators disagree with such 
conclusions.140 The reason for this negative assessment is that all international conventions rest 
upon the perception that copyright is a private, exclusive right. Accordingly, non-voluntary 
licenses are the exception to this rule, and they have to be of a limited nature.141 Moreover, there 
is a tendency to overlook the fact that the three-step test was introduced as a diplomatic agreement 
with relatively loose constraint, permitting parties of the Berne Convention to retain their existing 
limitations and exceptions, and avoid a disharmonised evolution of national limitations and 
                                                 
136 Senftleben, M. [2004], op.cit. 226-241. Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. Reinbothe-von Lewinski, [2002], op.cit. 
Article 10 WCT no. 23. Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], op.cit. 53. Peukert, A. [2009], op.cit. 172. German Federal Supreme 
Court, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht (GRUR) 963, 967 (2002). 
137 Senftleben, M. [2004], op.cit. 237. 
138 Dusollier-Ker [2009], ‘Private copy levies and technical protection of copyright: the uneasy accommodation of 
two conflicting logics, in Estelle Derclaye (edn), Research handbook on the future of EU copyright, (EE 2009), 349-
372, 353. 
139 EML [2009], op.cit. 28. 
140 Rietjens, B. [2006], ‘Copyright and the three-step-test: are broadband levies too good to be true?’ 20(3) 
International Review of Law Computer & Technology 323-336. ‘Indeed, an exception for large-scale ‘private’ 
copying of the ‘sharing’ type might well conflict with a normal exploitation’. Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], op.cit.55-6. 
‘Placing of an entire protected work on the digital networks for free access may unreasonably prejudice the author’s 
interests in a considerable degree’ Reinbothe-von Lewinski [2002], op.cit. Article 10 WCT no. 22. ‘It is difficult to 
see any justification that can be made for these uses under the three-step-test’. Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. 80. ‘[the 
three-step-test] might just prove itself flexible enough to allow some limited experimentation with virtual markets 
[although it] was devised as a mechanism to reinforce a model of copyright based in exclusive rights. Eckersley, P. 
[2004] 158. 
141 A broad levy system has not generally been accepted as a true alternative to exclusive rights in the history of 
international copyright law. A general compulsory license for the dissemination of knowledge was rejected in 1967, 
during the Stockholm Conference. Report in Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. 481. Germany suggested that exceptions to 
the reproduction should not conflict with the author’s right to obtain equitable remuneration. Ibid. 196. Remuneration 
schemes for private copying were discussed prior to the WIPO conference in 1996, but they were not included in the 
conference’s agenda. This holds true also for the WIPO Treaties of 1996. Various statements at the WIPO 
Symposiums in 1993, 1994, and 1995 stressed the notion of copyright as an exclusive right in cyberspace. Ficsor, M 
[2002], The law of copyright and the internet-The 1996 WIPO Treaties, their interpretation and implementation (OUP 
2002) 5.125-7, 5.113-120, C10.33. ‘It would be preferable to admit private copying as an enforceable right against 
technical devices and to solve the problem by a working system of equitable remuneration’. Geiger, C. [2005], Right 
to copy v. three-step test, 1 C.R.I. 7, Para. 371-380. 
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exceptions. The interpretation of the test should therefore be flexible and balanced. Restrictive 
interpretations appear to be unjustified when they contrast with the test’s original ratio. 
Nevertheless, the test itself produces a number of problems in an era in which legislative 
freedom and broad harmonisation are needed. In particular, it has been noted that: 
Organisations representing right-holders now frequently suggest that expansions to 
the scope of exceptions in copyright law would, or might, be incompatible with the 
‘three-step test’ and would therefore contravene international and European law. 
[…] Given the fundamentally uncertain requirements of the ‘three-step test’ and 
taking into account the role it was originally designed to fulfil, these claims are 
usually little more than misleading wishful-thinking.142 
Thus, the test has come under pressure owing to its rigidness and restrictive approach, as 
well as its inability to allocate the balance between the interests involved. An international 
consensus regarding the scope of the test is still missing, and it has been suggested that the test 
may block the limitations adjustments needed, in particular, for networking technologies.143 The 
serious risk is that: 
the three-step test will further constrain the existing architecture of copyright, will 
limit both judicial and legislative freedom, and incrementally suppress and subdue 
balances that exist in national systems.144 
Nevertheless, the three-step-test is probably not the true reason why these proposals keep failing. 
  
5. Conclusion 
The digital environment, undoubtedly, still poses challenges to the current copyright 
regime thus forcing us to keep overthinking the existing system. This is why we believe proposal 
                                                 
142 Griffiths, J. [2010], Rhetoric & the ‘three-step test’: copyright reforms in the United Kingdom, 32(7) E.I.P.R. 309-
312. 309. 
143 Westkamp, G. [2008], ‘The three-step-test and copyright limitations in Europe: European copyright law between 
approximation and national decision making’, J.C.S.U.S.A. 2-3, 11, 31-32. Max Planck-Queen Mary [2009], 
‘Declaration: a balanced interpretation of the three-step-test’, www.ip.mpg.de/ 
shared/data/pdf/declaration_three_steps.pdf. [13/08/2010]. Geiger, C. [2009] op.cit. 627-37. 
144 Westkamp, G. [2008], op.cit. 63. 
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for alternative compensation or remunerations system keep reappearing notwithstanding the 
heated opposition. 
The main opposition to alternative remuneration systems is the accusation that it is an 
expropriation of the copyright owners’ exclusive ‘property’ rights.145 However, ‘the protection of 
property does not mean an absolute guarantee of preservation of the status quo, in the sense that 
all achieved legal positions are sacrosanct’.146 Promoters of alternative remuneration systems 
argue that it is rather a limitation of rights in conformity to the principle of proportionality, not an 
expropriation. These proposals serve legitimate purposes; they are adequate, necessary and 
appropriate;147 they resolve the collision of rights between copyright owners and users, ensuring 
remuneration and respecting the privacy of users. These proposed systems are not only legitimate 
but also necessary given the large numbers of infringements – and infringers – preventing 
copyright owners from enforcing their rights.148 They are also, arguably, adequate and 
proportionate.149 
Another criticism of alternative remuneration systems is the argument that those users who 
do not infringe copyright would be required to pay a levy anyway.150 This, however, could be 
mitigated by calculating the sums users are required to pay in proportion to their bandwidth 
                                                 
145 For example, among the ‘Ten arguments against the kultur flat-rate’ the Association of German Music Industry 
argud that: ‘6) the culture flat-rate takes away from creators and artists the right to control the usage of their works; 
7) the culture flat-rate is inconsistent with the economic principles of our society; [...] 9) the culture flat-rate devalues 
intellectual property. Bundesverband Musikindustrie [2010], Bundesverband Musikindustrie veröffentlicht 
Positionspapier zur Kulturflatrate, 25 January, 
<www.musikindustrie.de/fileadmin/news/presse/100125_Kulturflatrate_10_Argumente_FINAL.pdf>. Translated in 
Dobusch, L. [2010], Extending private copying levies: approaching a culture flat-rate?, 
<http://governancexborders.wordpress.com/2010/01/30/extending-private-copying-levies-approaching-a-culture-
flat-rate> accessed 15 August 2010. 
146 EML [2009], op.cit. 14. 
147 Grassmuck, V. [2009], op.cit. 
148 EML [2009], op.cit. Conclusions. ‘Copyrights in contradistinction to material property are in the final instance not 
intended to exclude others from the use of works but to enable authors to generate earnings from their exploitation’. 
Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
150 This is not unprecedented: the introduction of private coping levies and the public broadcast fee caused similar 
critiques. Moreover, in a sense, notwithstanding the differences between remunerations systems, levies and taxes, 
citizens often pays for services they do not use. For instance, taxes paid by healthy people without children are often 
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 28 
 
consumption.151 Sharing a protected work over a network consumes substantial bandwidth and if, 
as it has been claimed,152 there is a direct connection between high-speed broadband and 
widespread copyright infringement, then ‘a graduated levy would be a fair solution’.153 
Even then, the true reason these proposals keep failing appears to be, arguably, the 
resistance and conservativeness of some of the stakeholders: copyright owners do not want to lose 
control, ISPs do not want to see their costs increase - hence the preference on maintaining and 
reinstating old business models. However:  
When a business model has become dated due to changed technological or social 
circumstances it would even be inadmissible to protect and artificially keep it alive 
through massive law-making intervention.154 
Finally, it should be noted, in support of these proposals that, if implemented, they would 
reduce the number of entities draining from the copyright value chain (credit card companies, 
iTunes, host providers, streaming service providers, etc.). Already in 2008 the ‘Attali 
Commission’,155 in its report on policies to overcome economic growth’s restrictions,156 presented 
a levy on internet use ‘as a reconciliation of economic development and free legal downloading’.157 
The report also suggested that filtering and monitoring systems conflict with constitutional rights 
and fundamentally undermine economic growth and, subsequently, it concluded that a levy on 
internet access providers would ensure a fair compensation for authors and other copyright owners 
without penalising internet development.158 
Copyright reforms should be addressed in line with the ‘bigger picture’ of the impact of 
these reforms on society as a whole. For instance, in 2012, the Council of Europe passed a 
                                                 
151 In University campuses, for instance, they have been calculated to consume 75% of the total capacity. Wade, J. 
[2004], The music industry war on piracy, 51(2) Risk Management, 10-15. 
152 Para. 2.4.2. 
153 Aigraain, P. [2008], op.cit. 
154 Grassmuck, V. [2009] op.cit. 
155 A commission set up by President Sarkozy following his election in 2007 to improve the level of competitiveness 
of the French economy. 
156 Attali, J. [2008], Rapport de la Commission pour la libération de la croissance française, 
<www.liberationdelacroissance.fr/files/rapports/RapportCLCF.pdf> accessed 15 August 2010. 
157 Ibid. Objective leading to Action 57. 
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comprehensive ‘Internet Governance Strategy’ setting the main action lines of the strategy that 
would govern its internet-related work as:159 
• maximising rights and freedoms for internet users; 
• advancing data protection and privacy; 
• enhancing the rule of law and effective co-operation against cybercrime; 
• maximising the internet’s potential to promote democracy and cultural diversity; 
• protecting and empowering children and young people. 
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the fact that global license proposals perfectly align with 
the above aims, they are still not receiving the deserved attention.  
A new regime is probably necessary in order to guarantee copyright holders remuneration 
for the use of their works.160 This regime has to be internationally harmonised, and must also 
consider the interests of every group involved, including creators, performers, users, technologists, 
states, and relevant industries. This legal framework should regulate the issues described in this 
work, but should be drafted in neutral terms so as to anticipate future challenges. It would apply 
whenever exclusive rights are difficult to implement or could have negative effects on society. 
This regime should not restrict fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and 
communication, privacy and data protection,161 and should consider copyright in its complexity, 
taking into account its legal aspects, but also its philosophical, economic, and social aspects.162  
                                                 
159 https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805cad04. 
160 ‘Under conditions of the digital age a new social contract between creatives and audiences  has to be negotiated, a 
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Today, a considerable part of the content shared on the internet is protected by copyright and is 
not authorised. Copyright owners have significant difficulties in convincing users that they should 
pay for the works they download and access.163 Nevertheless, ‘Copyright has adapted in the past; 
it will again’.164 
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